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A caveat: the ‘indeterminacy hypothesis’ Abstract 
 
We fit a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with stochastic volatility 
to the Federal Funds rate, GDP deflator inflation, real GDP growth, and the rate of 
growth of M2. We identify 4 shocks–monetary policy, demand non-policy, supply, 
and money demand–by imposing sign restrictions on the estimated reduced-form 
VAR on a period-by-period basis. The evolution of the monetary rule in the structural 
VAR accords well with narrative accounts of post-WWII U.S. economic history, with 
(e.g.) significant increases in the long-run coefficients on inflation and money growth 
around the time of the Volcker disinflation. Overall, however, our evidence points 
towards a dominant role played by good luck in fostering the more stable 
macroeconomic environment of the last two decades. First, the Great Inflation was 
due, to a dominant extent, to large demand non-policy shocks, and to a lower extent 
to supply shocks. Second, imposing either Volcker or Greenspan over the entire 
sample period would only have had a limited impact on the Great Inflation episode, 
while imposing Burns and Miller would have resulted in a counterfactual inflation 
path remarkably close to the actual historical one. Although the systematic 
component of monetary policy clearly appears to have improved over the sample 
period, this does not appear to have been the dominant influence in post-WWII U.S. 
macroeconomic dynamics. 
 
Keywords: Bayesian VARs; stochastic volatility; identified VARs; time-varying 
parameters; frequency domain; Great Inflation; Lucas critique. 
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Non Technical Summary
The U.S. ‘Great Moderation’–the dramatic decrease in macroeconomic volatility
across the board of the last two decades–has been, in recent years, one of the most
intensely investigated topics in macroeconomics. The stated goal of this strand of
literature is to identify the relative contributions of two main candidates, good policy
and good luck, in fostering the more stable macroeconomic environment of the most
recent period. If the bulk of the stability of the post-Volcker stabilisation era were
indeed to be attributed to the impact of improved monetary policy, we might then
be reasonably conﬁdent that macroeconomic instability is a memory of the past–
with the right monetary policy in place, the 1970s could never return. If, on the
o t h e rh a n d ,t h ec u r r e n t ,m o r es t a b l em a c r o e c o n o m i ce n v i r o n m e n tf o u n di t so r i g i ni n
the fact that, in recent years, the U.S. economy has been spared the large shocks
of previous decades, even the best monetary policy would not necessarily shield the
United States from a reappearance of macroeconomic turbulence.
In this paper we ﬁt a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with sto-
chastic volatility to the Federal Funds rate, GDP deﬂator inﬂation, real GDP growth,
and the rate of growth of M2, in order to investigate the evolution of both reduced-
form properties, and, especially, structural characteristics of the U.S. economy over
the post-1960 period. We identify 4 shocks–monetary policy, demand non-policy,
supply, and money demand–by imposing sign restrictions on the estimated reduced-
form VAR on a period-by-period basis, and we then investigate time-variation in sev-
eral key aspects of the structure we recovered. Our main results may be summarised
as follows.
The evolution of the long-run coeﬃcients of the structural monetary rule in the
VAR accords remarkably well with narrative accounts of post-WWII U.S. macroeco-
nomic history, with (e.g.) a comparatively less aggressive counter-inﬂationary stance
over the ﬁrst part of the sample, and dramatic increases in the coeﬃcients on in-
ﬂation and money growth around the time of the Volcker disinﬂation. Interestingly,
the FED’s counter-inﬂationary stance clearly appears to have temporarily decreased
around the time of both the 1990-1991 recession, and the most recent one, following
the collapse of the dotcom bubble.
Overall, however–in line with the previous contributions of (e.g.) Primiceri
(2005), Sims and Zha (2006), and Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006)–our ev-
idence points towards a dominant role played by good luck in fostering the more
stable macroeconomic environment of the last two decades. First, the Great Inﬂation
was due, to a dominant extent, to large demand non-policy shocks, and to a lower
extent to supply shocks. Second, ‘bringing Alan Greenspan back in time’ would only
have had a limited impact on the Great Inﬂation episode, with the maximum impact
on inﬂation equal to slightly more than three percentage points, at the cost of signif-
icantly lower output growth in the ﬁrst part of the sample, especially in the second
half of the 1970s.
So, although the systematic component of monetary policy clearly appears to have
improved over the sample period, this does not appear to have been the dominant
inﬂuence in post-WWII U.S. macroeconomic dynamics.1 Introduction
The U.S. ‘Great Moderation’–the dramatic decrease in macroeconomic volatility
across the board of the last two decades–has been, in recent years, one of the most
intensely investigated topics in macroeconomics.1 The stated goal of this strand of
literature is to identify the relative contributions of two main candidates, good policy
and good luck, in fostering the more stable macroeconomic environment of the most
recent period. If the bulk of the stability of the post-Volcker stabilisation era were
indeed to be attributed to the impact of improved monetary policy, we might then
be reasonably conﬁdent that macroeconomic instability is a memory of the past–
with the right monetary policy in place, the 1970s could never return. If, on the
o t h e rh a n d ,t h ec u r r e n t ,m o r es t a b l em a c r o e c o n o m i ce n v i r o n m e n tf o u n di t so r i g i ni n
the fact that, in recent years, the U.S. economy has been spared the large shocks of
previous decades, even the best monetary policy would not necessarily shield the U.S.
from a reappearance of macroeconomic turbulence.
In this paper we ﬁt a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with sto-
chastic volatility to the Federal Funds rate, GDP deﬂator inﬂation, real GDP growth,
and the rate of growth of M2, in order to investigate the evolution of both reduced-
form properties, and, especially, structural characteristics of the U.S. economy over
the post-1960 period. We identify 4 shocks–monetary policy, demand non-policy,
supply, and money demand–by imposing sign restrictions on the estimated reduced-
form VAR on a period-by-period basis, and we then investigate time-variation in sev-
eral key aspects of the structure we recovered. Our main results may be summarised
as follows.
• The evolution of the long-run coeﬃcients of the structural monetary rule in
the VAR accords remarkably well with narrative accounts of post-WWII U.S.
macroeconomic history, with (e.g.) a comparatively less aggressive counter-
inﬂationary stance over the ﬁrst part of the sample, and dramatic increases in
the coeﬃcients on inﬂation and money growth around the time of the Volcker
disinﬂation. Interestingly, the FED’s counter-inﬂationary stance clearly appears
to have temporarily decreased around the time of both the 1990-1991 recession,
and the most recent one, following the collapse of the dotcom bubble.
• Overall, however–in line with the previous contributions of Stock and Wat-
son (2002), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), and Canova and his co-
authors–our evidence points towards a dominant role played by good luck in
fostering the more stable macroeconomic environment of the last two decades.
First, the Great Inﬂation was due, to a dominant extent, to large demand non-
policy shocks, and to a lower extent to supply shocks. Second, ‘bringing Alan
Greenspan back in time’ would only have had a limited impact on the Great
1See in particular Stock and Watson (2002), Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004), Primiceri (2005),
Canova and Gambetti (2005), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) and Sims and Zha (2006).
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than three percentage points, at the cost of signiﬁcantly lower output growth
in the ﬁrst part of the sample, especially in the second half of the 1970s.
So, although the systematic component of monetary policy clearly appears to have
improved over the sample period, this does not appear to have been the dominant
inﬂuence in post-WWII U.S. macroeconomic dynamics.
From a methodological point of view, our paper improves upon previous studies
based on time-varying parameters models along several dimensions. Primiceri (2005)
only considers a Cholesky decomposition–which allows him to identify only a mon-
etary policy shock–and in computing impulse-responses disregards the uncertainty
originating from future time-variation in the VAR’s structure, which we instead tackle
via Monte Carlo integration. Both Canova and Gambetti (2005) and Gambetti,
Pappa, and Canova (2006), on the other hand, do not have a time-varying covariance
structure. While it is true that random-walk time-variation in the VAR’s coeﬃcients
introduces a form of heteroskedasticity in the model, a key problem is that, by con-
struction, it induces a close correlation between changes in the VAR’s coeﬃcients and
changes in the covariance structure, which a comparison between Cogley and Sargent
(2002) and Cogley and Sargent (2005) clearly shows not to be in the data–at least
for the U.S.–and which, in general we have no reason to assume to hold.2
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the reduced-form speci-
ﬁcation for the time-varying parameters VAR with stochastic volatility which we
use throughout the paper. Section 3 discusses key details of Bayesian inference–in
particular, our choices for the priors, and the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm
we use to simulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states
conditional on the data. Section 4 discusses time-variation in the reduced-form prop-
erties of the economy since the second half of the 1960s, while Section 5 focusses on
structural features. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Time-Varying Parameters VAR with Stochas-
tic Volatility
In what follows we work with the following time-varying parameters VAR(p)m o d e l :
Yt = B0,t + B1,tYt−1 + ... + Bp,tYt−p +  t ≡ X
0
tθt +  t (1)
where the notation is obvious, and Yt is deﬁned as Yt ≡ [rt, πt,y t,m t]0,w i t hrt,
πt,y t,m t being the Federal funds rate, GDP deﬂator inﬂation, and the rates of growth
2In his comment on Cogley and Sargent (2002), Stock (2002) stresses how, if the data generation
process is characterised by a time-varying volatility structure, imposition of a constant covariance
stucture automatically induces an upward bias in the estimated extent of parameters’ drift in the
VAR, as the algorithm compensates for lack of time-variation in the covariance by ‘blowing up’
time-variation in the VAR’s coeﬃcients.
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A).3 The overall sample period is 1959:1-2005:4. For reasons of comparability with
other papers in the literature4 we set the lag order to p=2. Following, e.g., Cogley and
Sargent (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), and Gambetti, Pappa,
and Canova (2006) the VAR’s time-varying parameters, collected in the vector θt,a r e
postulated to evolve according to
p(θt | θt−1, Q)=I(θt) f(θt | θt−1, Q) (2)
with I(θt) being an indicator function rejecting unstable draws–thus enforcing a
stationarity constraint on the VAR–and with f(θt | θt−1, Q) given by
θt = θt−1 + ηt (3)
with ηt ∼ N(0,Q ). The VAR’s reduced-form innovations in (1) are postulated to
be zero-mean normally distributed, with time-varying covariance matrix Ωt which,
following established practice, we factor as




























with the hi,t evolving as geometric random walks,
lnhi,t =l nhi,t−1 + νi,t (6)
For future reference, we deﬁne ht ≡ [h1,t, h2,t,h 3,t,h 4,t]0. Following Primiceri (2005),
we postulate the non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At–which we collect
in the vector αt ≡ [α21,t, α31,t, ..., α43,t]0–to evolve as driftless random walks,
αt = αt−1 + τt ,( 7 )
3GDP deﬂator inﬂation and the rates of growth of real GDP and nominal M2 have been computed
as the non-annualised quarter-on-quarter rates of growth of the relevant series. The Federal funds
rate has then been rescaled in order to make it conceptually comparable with the other three series.
Speciﬁcally, by deﬁning the quarter-on-quarter and the annualised quarter-on-quarter ﬁgures for the
Federal Funds rate as rt and rA
t ,w eh a v ert=(1+rA
t )1/4-1.
4See e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), and Gambetti,
Pappa, and Canova (2006).
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t ut. As discussed in Primiceri (2005), there are two
justiﬁcations for assuming a block-diagonal structure for Vt. First, parsimony, as
the model is already quite heavily parameterized. Second, ‘allowing for a completely
generic correlation structure among diﬀerent sources of uncertainty would preclude
any structural interpretation of the innovations’.5 Finally, following, again, Primiceri
(2005) we adopt the additional simplifying assumption of postulating a block-diagonal
structure for S,t o o – n a m e l y








with S1 ≡ Var(τ21,t), S2 ≡ Var([τ31,t,τ32,t]0),a n dS3 ≡ Var([τ41,t,τ32,t,τ43,t]0),t h u s
implying that the non-zero and non-one elements of At belonging to diﬀerent rows
evolve independently. As discussed in Primiceri (2005, Appendix A.2), this assump-
tion drastically simpliﬁes inference, as it allows to do Gibbs sampling on the non-zero
and non-one elements of At equation by equation.
We estimate (1)-(9) via Bayesian methods. The next section discusses our choices
for the priors, and the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm we use to simulate the
posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states conditional on the data.
3 Bayesian Inference
We estimate (1)-(9) via Bayesian methods. The next two subsections describe our
choices for the priors, and the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm we use to sim-
ulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states conditional
on the data, while the third section discusses how we check for convergence of the
Markov chain to the ergodic distribution.
3.1 Priors
For the sake of simplicity, the prior distributions for the initial values of the states–
θ0, α0,a n dh0–which we postulate all to be normal, are assumed to be independent
both from one another, and from the distribution of the hyperparameters. In order
5Primiceri (2005, pp. 6-7).
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v e r s i o no f( 1 )b a s e do nt h eﬁrst 8 years of data, from 1959 Q3 to 1966 Q4, and we set
θ0 ∼ N
h
ˆ θOLS,4 · ˆ V (ˆ θOLS)
i
(10)
As for α0 and h0 we proceed as follows. Let ˆ ΣOLS be the estimated covariance matrix
of  t from the time-invariant VAR, and let C be the lower-triangular Choleski factor
of ˆ ΣOLS–i.e., CC0 = ˆ ΣOLS. We set
lnh0 ∼ N(lnµ0,10 × I3) (11)
where µ0 is a vector collecting the logarithms of the squared elements on the diag-
onal of C. We then divide each column of C by the corresponding element on the
diagonal–let’s call the matrix we thus obtain ˜ C–and we set
α0 ∼ N[˜ α0, ˜ V (˜ α0)] (12)
where ˜ α0–which, for future reference, we deﬁne as ˜ α0 ≡ [˜ α0,11, ˜ α0,21, ..., ˜ α0,61]0–is a
vector collecting all the non-zero and non-one elements of ˜ C−1 (i.e, the elements below
the diagonal), and its covariance matrix, ˜ V (˜ α0),i sp o s t u l a t e dt ob ed i a g o n a l ,w i t h
each individual (j,j) element equal to 10 times the absolute value of the corresponding
j-th element of ˜ α0. Such a choice for the covariance matrix of α0 is clearly arbitrary,
but is motivated by our goal to scale the variance of each individual element of α0 in
such a way as to take into account of the element’s magnitude.
Turning to the hyperparameters, we postulate independence between the para-
meters corresponding to the three matrices Q, S,a n dZ–an assumption we adopt
uniquely for reasons of convenience–and we make the following, standard assump-






with prior degrees of freedom T0 and scale matrix T0 ¯ Q. In order to minimize the
impact of the prior, thus maximizing the inﬂu e n c eo fs a m p l ei n f o r m a t i o n ,w es e tT0
equal to the minimum value allowed, the length of θt plus one. As for ¯ Q, we calibrate
it as ¯ Q= γ × ˆ ΣOLS, setting γ=1.0×10−4, the same value used in Primiceri (2005), a
relatively ‘conservative’ prior compared to the 3.5×10−4 used by Cogley and Sargent
(2005).
The three blocks of S are assumed to follow inverted Wishart distributions, with
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¯ S2=10−3×diag([|˜ α0,21|,|˜ α0,31|]0) and ¯ S3=10−3×diag([|˜ α0,41|,|˜ α0,51|,|˜ α0,61|]0). Such a
calibration is consistent with the one we adopted for Q,a si ti se q u i v a l e n tt os e t t i n g
¯ S1, ¯ S2 and ¯ S3 equal to 10−4 times the relevant diagonal block of ˜ V (˜ α0) in (12).
Finally, as for the variances of the stochastic volatility innovations, we follow Cogley













3.2 Simulating the posterior distribution
We simulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states condi-
tional on the data via the following MCMC algorithm, combining elements of Prim-
iceri (2005) and Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005). In what follows, xt denotes the
entire history of the vector x up to time t–i.e. xt ≡ [x0
1, x0
2,, x0
t]0–while T is the
sample length.
(a) Drawing the elements of θt Conditional on Y T, αT,a n dHT,t h eo b s e r v a t i o n
equation (1) is linear, with Gaussian innovations and a known covariance matrix.
Following Carter and Kohn (2004), the density p(θ
















Conditional on αT, HT,a n dV , the standard Kalman ﬁlter recursions nail down the
ﬁrst element on the right hand side of (18), p(θT|Y T,α T,HT,V) = N(θT,P T),w i t h
PT being the precision matrix of θT produced by the Kalman ﬁlter. The remaining
elements in the factorization can then be computed via the backward recursion algo-
rithm found, e.g., in Kim and Nelson (2000), or Cogley and Sargent (2005, appendix
B.2.1). Given the conditional normality of θt,w eh a v e
θt|t+1 = θt|t + Pt|tP
−1
t+1|t (θt+1 − θt) (19)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tP
−1
t+1|tPt|t (20)
which provides, for each t from T-1 to 1, the remaining elements in (1), p(θt|θt+1,
Y T, αT, HT, V ) = N(θt|t+1, Pt|t+1). Speciﬁcally, the backward recursion starts with
ad r a wf r o mN(θT,P T),c a l li t˜ θT Conditional on ˜ θT, (19)-(20) give us θT−1|T and
PT−1|T, thus allowing us to draw ˜ θT−1 from N(θT−1|T,P T−1|T),a n ds oo nu n t i lt=1.
(b) Drawing the elements of αt Conditional on Y T, θ
T,a n dHT, following Prim-
iceri (2005), we draw the elements of αt a sf o l l o w s .E q u a t i o n( 1 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
At˜ Yt ≡ At(Yt-X
0
tθt)=At t ≡ ut,w i t hV a r ( ut)=Ht,n a m e l y
˜ Y2,t = −α21,t˜ Y1,t + u2,t (21)
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˜ Y4,t = −α41,t˜ Y1,t − α42,t˜ Y2,t − α43,t˜ Y3,t + u4,t (23)
–plus the identity ˜ Y1,t = u1,t–where [˜ Y1,t, ˜ Y2,t, ˜ Y3,t, ˜ Y4,t]0 ≡ ˜ Yt. Based on the ob-
servation equations (21)-(23), and the transition equation (7), the elements of αt
can then be drawn by applying the same algorithm we described in the previous
paragraph separately to (21), (22) and (23). The assumption that S has the block-
diagonal structure (9) is in this respect crucial, although, as stressed by Primiceri
(2005, Appendix D), it could in principle be relaxed.
(c) Drawing the elements of Ht Conditional on Y T, θ
T,a n dαT, the orthogo-
nalised innovations ut ≡ At(Yt-X
0
tθt),w i t hV a r ( ut)=Ht, are observable. Following
Cogley and Sargent (2002), we then sample the hi,t’s by applying the univariate al-
gorithm of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (2004) element by element.6
(d) Drawing the hyperparameters Finally, conditional on Y T, θ
T, HT,a n dαT,
the innovations to θt, αt,t h ehi,t’s are observable, which allows us to draw the
hyperparameters–the elements of Q, S1, S2 S3,a n dt h eσ2
i–from their respective
distributions.
Summing up, the MCMC algorithm simulates the posterior distribution of the
states and the hyperparameters, conditional on the data, by iterating on (a)-(d). In
what follows we use a burn-in period of 50,000 iterations to converge to the ergodic
distribution, and after that we run 10,000 more iterations sampling every 10th draw
in order to reduce the autocorrelation across draws.7
3.3 Assessing the convergence of the Markov chain to the
ergodic distribution
Following Primiceri (2005), we assess the convergence of the Markov chain by inspect-
ing the autocorrelation properties of the ergodic distribution’s draws. Speciﬁcally, in
what follows we consider the draws’ ineﬃciency factors (henceforth, IFs), deﬁned as
the inverse of the relative numerical eﬃciency measure of Geweke (1992),






where S(ω) is the spectral density of the sequence of draws from the Gibbs sampler
for the quantity of interest at the frequency ω. We estimate the spectral densities by
smoothing the periodograms in the frequency domain by means of a Bartlett spectral
window. Following Berkowitz and Diebold (1998), we select the bandwidth parameter
automatically via the procedure introduced by Beltrao and Bloomﬁeld (1987).
6For details, see Cogley and Sargent (2005, Appendix B.2.5).
7In this we follow Cogley and Sargent (2005). As stressed by Cogley and Sargent (2005), however,
this has the drawback of ‘increasing the variance of ensemble averages from the simulation’.
12
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elements of the matrices Q, Z,a n dS–and for the states, i.e. the time-varying coef-
ﬁcients of the VAR (the θt), the volatilities (the hi,t’s), and the non-zero elements of
the matrix At.A st h eﬁgure clearly shows, the autocorrelation of the draws is uni-
formly very low, being in the vast majority of cases around or below 3–as stressed by
Primiceri (2005, Appendix B), values of the IFs below or around twenty are generally
regarded as satisfactory.
4 Reduced-Form Evidence
Figures 2 to 7 show reduced-form evidence on the evolution of the U.S. economy since
the second half of the 1960s–speciﬁcally, the time-varying elements of Ωt;t h es p e c t r a ,
normalised spectra and overall variance of inﬂation; the four series’ time-varying
overall predictability; and the standard deviations of k-step-ahead projections.
4.1 The evolution of Ωt
4.1.1 The Great Moderation and the evolution of ln|Ωt|
The top-left panel of Figure 2 provides a simple and stark illustration of the Great
Moderation phenomenon, by plotting the median of the time-varying distribution of
ln|Ωt|, which, following Cogley and Sargent (2005),8 we interpret as a measure of the
total amount of noise ‘hitting the system’ at each point in time9–together with the
16th and 84th percentiles.10 ln|Ωt| is estimated to have signiﬁcantly increased around
t h et i m eo ft h eG r e a tI n ﬂation episode,11 reaching a historical peak in 1980:2; to
have dramatically decreased under the Chairmanship of Paul Volcker, and during the
8In turn, they were following Whittle (1953)–see Cogley and Sargent (2005, Section 3.5).
9An anonymous referee pointed out that this ‘[...] can be misleading: suppose that the system
has two shocks which have high variance, but are nearly linearly dependent. Then log determinant
of variance matrix will be very small, and yet the system may be very hard to predict.’ We entirely
take this point, so it is important to be aware of the fact that these results suﬀer from this limitation.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,i ti sn o tc l e a ra ta l l( a tl e a s t ,t ou s. . . )h o wt oe ﬀectively solve this problem.
10Under normality, the 16th and 84th percentiles are the bounds of a one standard deviation
conﬁdence interval, so that on average, for the normal distribution, the interval between these two
percentiles encloses 68% of the distribution of the object of interest.
11Interestingly, the top-left panel of Figure 2 clearly suggests that the total prediction variance
started increasing before the collapse of Bretton Woods, in August 1971. There are two possible–
and not mutually exclusive–interpretations of this result. First, from a strictly technical point of
view, estimates of the states based on Gibbs sampling are, by construction, two-sided, and in the
case of sharp breaks they therefore inevitably tend to ‘mix the future with the past’, thus giving
the impression that the change took place before it actually did. Because of this, these results
are not incompatible with the notion that the increase in the total prediction variance actually
took place after August 1971. A second possibility is that these results are precisely capturing
the macroeconomic turbulence that ultimately undid Bretton Woods–e.g. the large ﬁscal shocks
associated with the ﬁnancing of the Vietnam war.
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2001 recession, thus testifying to the marked increase in macroeconomic turbulence
associated with the unwinding of the dotcom bubble; and to have decreased ever
since, reaching (based on median estimates) a historical low in the last quarter of the
sample, 2005:4.
4.1.2 The other components of Ωt
Turning to the other components of Ωt, the remaining four panels in the top row
of Figure 2 show the evolution of the standard deviations of the VAR’s residuals, in
basis points. For all four series, the volatility of reduced-form shocks reached a peak
around the time of the Volcker disinﬂation. This is especially clear for the Federal
Funds rate, which exhibited a dramatic spike corresponding to the FED’s temporary
adoption of a policy of targeting non-borrowed reserves, between October 1979 and
October 1982, but it is equally apparent, although in a less dramatic fashion, for the
other three series.
The bottom row of Figure 2 shows the time-varying correlations between the four
reduced-form shocks. The sign of the correlation between shocks to inﬂation and to the
Federal Funds rate switched (based on median estimates) from predominantly positive
before the Volcker disinﬂation to negative thereafter. Although the interpretation
of this ﬁnding within the present non-structural setting is inevitably fraught with
hazards, such evidence is compatible with the notion that during the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e
sample the U.S. economy had been hit by large structural inﬂationary disturbances,
which caused inﬂation to shoot up, and monetary policy ‘to play catch-up’ with
inﬂation, thus inducing a positive correlation between the reduced-form shocks to
inﬂation and the Federal Funds rate. During the second half of the sample, on the
other hand, with the fall in the magnitude of structural inﬂationary disturbances, the
negative correlation between reduced-form shocks to the Federal Funds rate and to
inﬂation induced by structural monetary policy shocks became dominant. By contrast,
the correlation between reduced-form shocks to M2 growth and the Federal Funds
rate has remained comparatively quite remarkably stable, ﬂuctuating around -0.5 for
the entire sample, with the only exception of the most recent years.
4.2 Inﬂation’s variance and persistence
Figure 3 shows the logarithms of the medians of the distributions of the estimated












(where sπ is a row vector selecting inﬂation); the logarithms of the medians of the
distributions of inﬂation’s time-varying overall variance (computed as the integral of
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of the distributions of the normalised spectrum computed based on (25); and the
median normalised spectrum at ω=0, together with the 16th and 84th percentiles.
In line with Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Cogley and Sargent (2005), the data
generation process for U.S. inﬂation appears to have experienced two major changes
s i n c et h et i m e so ft h eG r e a tI n ﬂation. First, a dramatic reduction in inﬂation’s overall
variance, with the spectral density of inﬂation markedly decreasing at all frequencies
around the time of the Volcker disinﬂation; and inﬂation’s overall variance reaching a
peak in 1980:2, systematically decreasing up until the end of Volcker’s Chairmanship,
and ﬂuctuating at comparatively low levels under Chairman Greenspan. Second, a
fall in persistence coinciding, once again, with the Volcker disinﬂation episode. Based
on median estimates the normalised spectrum of inﬂation at ω=0 is estimated to
have fallen from a peak of 0.475 in 1975:1 to a low of 0.088 in 1985:1. After slightly
increasing during the second half of the 1980s, it has ﬂuctuated, since mid-1992,
between 0.044 and 0.06.12 Given that, as it is well-known–see e.g. Granger and
Newbold (1986) and Barsky (1987)–a stochastic process’ persistence is positively
related to its extent of R2-forecastability, such marked fall in inﬂation persistence
should automatically imply a corresponding decrease in inﬂation’s predictability. As
the next section shows, this has indeed been the case.
4.3 Assessing changes in the economy’s predictability
Following Cogley (2005), we measure changes in the four series’ predictability by
computing, for each of them, a time-varying multivariate R2 statistic on a quarter-
12A word of caution on the interpretation of persistence measures. As it is well known from the
work of, e.g., Pierre Perron–see in particular Perron (1989)–measured persistence crucially depends
on the assumed speciﬁcation for the mean (equilibrium component) of the process. Although in
the present context we have postulated the equilibrium components of the three series to evolve
smoothly over time, an alternative, and equally plausible, speciﬁcation would be a step function–
for an application to inﬂation within the univariate context, see e.g. Corvoisier and Mojon (2005).
There are several reasons to prefer the present speciﬁcation. First, and least important, for reasons
of consistency with the previous literature, as the related work of Primiceri (2005), Canova and
Gambetti (2005), and Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) has adopted the same speciﬁcation.
Second, and crucially, modelling the equilibrium components of the three series according to step
functions would require a ﬁxed-coeﬃcients VAR with (some of the) coeﬃcients subject to structural
breaks. Although, in principle, the break dates could be estimated via structural break tests–e.g.,
Bai and Perron (2003)–in practice both Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Benati (2007a) have shown
such tests to possess a sometimes remarkably low power when the true DGP is characterised by
random walk time variation. Time-varying parameters models, on the other hand, are well known
for being capable of successfully tracking processes subject to structural breaks. As a consequence,
while the ‘step function’ speciﬁcation can be expected to perform well if and only if the DGP is
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is variable x’s estimated time-varying innovation variance, based on Kolmogorov’s
formula.
Figure 4 shows, for the four series, the medians of the distributions of the time-
varying multivariate R2 statistics, together with the 16th and 84th percentiles, while
Table 1 reports the same objects for four selected quarters. As both the ﬁgure and the
t a b l em a k ec l e a r ,t h ep r e d i c t a b i l i t yo ft h eF e d e r a lF u n d sr a t eh a sr e m a i n e dv i r t u a l l y
unchanged at values very close to one over the entire sample period,14 while M2
growth’s forecastability has remained largely unchanged with the possible exception
of two mild spikes corresponding to the recession of the ﬁrst half of the 1970s, and
to the Volcker recession. Output growth exhibits, overall, a pattern very similar to
that of M2 growth, with the main diﬀerences being, ﬁrst, a uniformly lower overall
predictability, and second, a much more pronounced U-shape around the time of the
Great Inﬂation, with a larger spike corresponding to the Volcker recession.15 Finally,
consistent with the results for inﬂation persistence discussed in the previous section–
and in line with the recent work of Stock and Watson (2007) documenting a decrease
in U.S. inﬂation forecastability over the most recent years–inﬂation’s predictability
is estimated to have reached (based on median estimates) a peak of 0.89 in 1980:2; to
have dramatically declined during Volcker’s Chairmanship, reaching 0.27 at the end
of his tenure; and to have ﬂuctuated at comparatively low levels, between 0.14 and
0.32, under Chairman Greenspan.
13Given the enormous computational burden associated with re-estimating the model every single
quarter, both this section’s exercise, and next section’s one, have been performed based on the
smoothed (i.e, two-sided) output of the Gibbs sampler conditional on the full sample. This implies
that both this section’s predictability measures, and next section’s k-step ahead projections, should
only be regarded as approximations to the authentic out-of-sample objects that would result from
a proper recursive estimation. (Unfortunately, it is not clear how to even gauge an idea of the
goodness of such approximation.)
14This was in a sense to be expected, given that, as it is well known, the Federal Funds rate’s
behavior is close to a unit root.
15This was, again, to be expected, given that the Volcker recession has been the deepest and
longest since the times of the Great Depression.
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the extent of uncertainty associated with future projections, as captured by the width
and shape of model-generated ‘fan charts’ for the four series of interest.
4.4 Evolving macroeconomic uncertainty
Figure 5 shows changes over time in the standard deviations (in basis points) of the
distributions of k-step-ahead forecasts for the four series of interest (for k =1 ,2 ,
..., 8 quarters), a simple measure of the extent of uncertainty associated with future
projections, while Table 1 reports the same objects for four selected quarters and
three horizons.16 Projections have been computed by stochastically simulating the
V A Ri n t ot h ef u t u r e1 , 0 0 0t i m e s . 17 As in the previous section, the present exercise
has been performed based on the two-sided output of the Gibbs sampler conditional
on the full sample, so that these k-step ahead projections should only be regarded
as approximations to the authentic out-of-sample objects that would result from a
proper recursive estimation.
Several ﬁndings clearly emerge from Figure 5. First, consistent with the discus-
sion on the U.S. ‘Great Moderation’ of section 4.1, for all series, and at all horizons,
the extent of uncertainty exhibits a very broadly similar hump-shaped pattern over
the sample period, with peaks reached, depending on the series, in either 1980 or
1981, corresponding to the Volcker disinﬂation. After decreasing dramatically during
subsequent years for all series, and at all horizons, uncertainty has then ﬂuctuated
at historically low levels ever since, with only mild and temporary increases corre-
sponding to the 2000-2001 recession. Focussing on the two-year horizon–the one tra-
ditionally associated with monetary policy decisions–the standard deviations of the
distributions of the projections for the Federal Funds rate, inﬂation, output growth,
and M2 growth have decreased from peaks of 332, 199, 419, and 375 basis points
in 1980-1981 to 41, 35, 95, and 125 basis points in the last quarter of the sample,
2005:4, thus testifying to the dramatic decrease in macroeconomic uncertainty across
t h eb o a r do v e rt h el a s tt w od e c a d e sa n dah a l f .
As for inﬂation, both the ﬁgure, and especially the table, clearly highlight the
impact on the extent of uncertainty surrounding its projections of two previously
discussed major changes which aﬀected its data generation process, a decrease in
both its persistence, and the volatility of its reduced-form innovations. While the
decrease in the volatility of innovations caused a generalised downward shift in the
16In order to correctly interpret the information contained in the Figure and the Table, the reader
should keep in mind that inﬂation and the rates of growth of output and M2 have been computed
as the non-annualised quarter-on-quarter rate of change of the relevant series, and that the Federal
Funds rate has been rescaled accordingly.
17Speciﬁcally, for every quarter, and for each of the 1,000 simulations, we start by sampling the
current state of the economy from the Gibbs sampler’s output for that quarter, by drawing a random
number from a uniform distribution deﬁned over [1; 1,000]. Conditional on this draw for the current
state of the economy at t, we then simulate the VAR 8 quarters into the future.
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between the forecast horizon and the standard deviation of the distribution of the
projections, making it ﬂatter than it was around the time of the Great Inﬂation.18
A comparison between these results and those in the previous sub-section therefore
clearly shows how–consistent with Stock and Watson (2007)–over the most recent
years U.S. inﬂation appears to have been, so far, less predictable than in the past
in the R2 sense, but, on the other hand, the extent of uncertainty associated with
inﬂation projection has drastically fallen, especially compared with the Great Inﬂation
episode.
5 Structural Analysis
In the spirit of Primiceri (2005), Canova and Gambetti (2005), and Gambetti, Pappa,
and Canova (2006), in this section we impose, on the estimated time-varying reduced-
form VAR, identifying restrictions on a period-by-period basis. We identify four
structural shocks–a monetary policy shock, a supply shock, a demand non-policy
shock, and a money demand shock–based on sign restrictions.
5.1 Identiﬁcation
Following Canova and de Nicolo (2002), Faust (1998), Peersman (2005), and Uhlig
(2005), our identiﬁcation strategy relies on imposing the following sign restrictions
on the contemporaneous impacts of the structural shocks on the endogenous variable.
We postulate
• the impact of a positive monetary policy shock to be non-negative on the interest
rate, and non-positive on inﬂation, and on the rates of growth of output and
M2;
• the impact of a demand non-policy shock be non-negative on all four variables.
• t h ei m p a c to fas u p p l ys h o c kb en o n - n e g a t i v eo no u t p u tg r o w t ha n dn o n - p o s i t i v e
on inﬂation, while we leave its impact on the other two variables as uncon-
strained.
• the impact of a money demand shock be non-negative on both the interest rate
a n dM 2g r o w t h ,a n dt ob en o n - p o s i t i v eo nb o t hi n ﬂation and output growth.
18The easiest way to understand such changes is to focus on the limiting theoretical cases of a pure
random walk and of a pure white noise process. While for a random walk uncertainty (as measured
by the conditional variance of the projection) increases linearly with the forecast horizon, for a pure
whote noise process it is constant at all horizons.
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the four shocks. We compute the time-varying structural impact matrix, A0,t,v i a
the procedure recently introduced by Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2005).19
Speciﬁcally, let Ωt = PtDtP0
t be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the
VAR’s time-varying covariance matrix Ωt,a n dl e t ˜ A0,t ≡ PtD
1
2
t .W ed r a wa nN × N
matrix, K,f r o mt h eN(0, 1) distribution, we take the QR decomposition of K–that
is, we compute matrices Q and R such that K=Q · R–and we compute the time-
varying structural impact matrix as A0,t= ˜ A0,t·Q0.I ft h ed r a ws a t i s ﬁes the restrictions
we keep it, otherwise we discard it and we keep drawing until the restrictions are sat-
isﬁed, as in the Rubio-Waggoner-Zha code SRestrictRWZalg.m which implements
their algorithm.
5.2 The systematic component of monetary policy
5.2.1 The historical record
Figure 6 plots the medians and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the distributions of
the long-run coeﬃcients on inﬂation, output growth, and M2 growth in the struc-
tural monetary rule.20 Abstracting from the signiﬁcant extent of econometric un-
certainty, especially apparent in the second half of the sample, and focussing on
median estimates, the results reported in the ﬁgure accord, overall, quite remark-
ably well with traditional, ‘narrative’ accounts of post-WWII U.S. macroeconomic
history.21 Up to the arrival of Paul Volcker, U.S. monetary stance is estimated to
have been characterised by virtually no reaction to output growth; no reaction, or
a mildly negative reaction to M2 growth; and, most importantly, a comparatively
low reaction to inﬂation, estimated, during the Great Inﬂation episode, at slightly
below one.22 Volcker’s chairmanship appears instead to have been characterised by
two major changes. First–in line with both ‘folk wisdom’, and traditional narrative
accounts–dramatic increases in the long-run coeﬃcients on both inﬂation and M2
growth.23 Second, a negative coeﬃcient on output growth around the time of the
19See at http://home.earthlink.net/~tzha02/ProgramCode/SRestrictRWZalg.m.
20We do not report the corresponding objects for the lagged Federal Funds rate as they are not
especially interesting, but they are available from the authors upon request.
21See in particular DeLong (1997).
22An important point to stress is that the fact that the long-run coeﬃcient on inﬂation be–or
not be–above one should be drastically de-emphasised. As stressed by, e.g., Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004), (in)determinacy is a system property–having to do with the interplay between all of the
coeﬃcients of the monetary rule and all of the structural coeﬃcients of the model–and as such it
bears no clear-cut relationship with the value taken by a single (policy or non-policy) coeﬃcient.
23As we already stressed in Section 4.1.1., because of the two-sided nature of Gibbs sampling’s
estimates, the fact that a speciﬁc object is estimated to have increased (decreased) over a period of
several years is not incompatible with the notion that, in reality, its change has been swift and sudden.
So in the present case our estimates are compatible with the notion that the long-run coeﬃcients
on inﬂation and M2 growth changed suddenly with the beginning of Volcker’s chairmanship.
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prevent further hikes in the Federal Funds rate.24 This is in line with the folk wis-
dom about the Volcker disinﬂation as a decisive move to squeeze inﬂation out of the
system ‘no matter what’. Finally, the period since mid-1980s has been characterised
by an overall declining weight on M2 growth; an overall increasing weight on output
growth; and an overall slightly declining weight on inﬂation. Interestingly, the weight
on inﬂation clearly appears to have temporarily declined corresponding to the two
most recent recessions, the 1990-1991 one, coinciding with the ﬁrst Gulf War, and
the one following the collapse of the dotcom bubble.25
Given that the evolution of the systematic component of monetary policy appears
to have been in line with narrative accounts of post-WWII U.S. macroeconomic his-
tory, a question naturally arises: ‘What if the most recent, stabilising monetary rule
had been in place around the time of the Great Inﬂa t i o n ?W o u l di th a v eb e e na b l e
to save the day?’. Maybe surprisingly, as the next section shows the fact that U.S.
monetary policy clearly appears to have improved compared with the pre-Volcker era
does not imply that the more recent monetary rule could have prevented the Great
Inﬂation at limited costs in terms of lost output.
5.2.2 Policy counterfactuals
Figures 7-9 shows results from a set of 1,000 counterfactual simulations in which we
have imposed, over the entire sample period, the structural monetary rules identiﬁed
for the Chairmanships26 of Arthur Burns and William Miller,27 Paul Volcker, and Alan
Greenspan.28 Speciﬁcally, the ﬁgures shows, for each of the four series, the medians
of the distributions of the diﬀerence between the counterfactual paths and the actual
24It is important to remember, once again, that during the experiment with targeting non-
borrowed reserves (October 1979-October 1982) the Federal Funds rate was behaving like a market
price, so that interest rates hikes were not purposefully engineered by the FED, but they were rather
accepted.
25The results in the ﬁrst two panels of Figure 6 are qualitatively in line with those reported in
Kim and Nelson (2006)–see their Figures 2 and 3. Admittedly, though, Kim and Nelson’s Figure 3
is for the output gap, as opposed to output growth.
26As found at the Federal Reserve Board’s website–see at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bios/boardmembership.htm–the Chairmen’s tenures are the
following. William McChesney Martin, Jr.: Apr. 2, 1951-Jan. 31, 1970; Arthur F. Burns: Feb.
1, 1970-Jan. 31, 1978; G. William Miller: Mar. 8, 1978-Aug. 6, 1979; Paul A. Volcker: Aug. 6,
1979-Aug. 11, 1987; Alan Greenspan Aug. 11, 1987-Jan. 31, 2006.
27Due to William Miller’s short tenure–just 17 months–we are ‘merging’ his Chairmanship with
Burns’.
28Speciﬁcally, for each simulation j=1, 2, ..., N,a te a c hq u a r t e rt=p+1, p+2, ..., T we draw three
random numbers, τ, indexing the quarter of the Chairmanship from which we draw the elements of
the structural monetary rule; and κt and κτ, indexing the iterations of the Gibbs sampler at times
t and, respectively, τ from which we draw the state of the economy. (All three numbers are deﬁned
over appropriate uniform distributions.) We then take all of the elements of the monetary rule from
iteration κτ of the Gibbs sampler for quarter τ, while we take everything else from iteration κt for
quarter t. We start each counterfactual simulation conditional on the ﬁrst p actual historical values
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observations available for the Chairmanship of William Martin (less than three years),
we have chosen not to report the results from the counterfactual corresponding to
this Chairman, but they are available upon request. Before delving into the results,
an important point to mention is that, as it has been well known for a long time,
structural VAR-based counterfactual simulations are, in principle, vulnerable to the
Lucas critique, so that, in general, the results of this section should necessarily be
t a k e nw i t hag r a i no fs a l t . 29 In a sub-section at the end of this paragraph we will
therefore discuss to which extent Lucas critique-type problems can reasonably be
thought to be relevant in the present context.
Starting with Figure 7, imposing Burns and Miller over the entire sample period
produces three main results. First, the counterfactual Federal Funds rate is–not
surprisingly–very close to the actual historical one up until the beginning of the
Volcker Chairmanship; the diﬀerence between the counterfactual path and the actual
series then decreases quite signiﬁcantly under Volcker, reaching (based on median
estimates) a negative peak in excess of four percentage points around the time of
the Volcker recession; and it then (very) slowly converges towards zero starting from
mid-1980s. Second, the counterfactual inﬂation path is strikingly similar to the actual
one–if anything it is, quite surprisingly, very slightly lower than the actual one
around the time of the Volcker disinﬂation. Third, as it should be expected, output
growth is comparatively higher around the time of the 1980-1982 recession (by a
maximum extent equal to about two percentage points), and it is still slightly higher
than the actual historical ﬁgure around the time of the 1990-1992 recession. Other
than that, however, the only non-negligible diﬀerence with historical outcomes is
around mid-1970s, when counterfactual output growth falls short of actual growth
by about one percentage point. Overall, results from this counterfactual simulation
clearly suggest, therefore, only a modest impact of policy on actual macroeconomic
outcomes, thus pointing towards luck, ﬁrst bad, and then good, as the explanation
for the bulk of post-WWII U.S. macroeconomic dynamics.30
Turning to Figure 8, imposing Paul Volcker over the entire sample period produces
of the vector Yt.
It was pointed out by an anonymous referee that in this way ‘the policy coeﬃcients do not evolve
smoothly [...], because now consecutive time periods [...] may receive policy coeﬃcients from non-
consecutive periods’. This is certainly true, but the key issue here is that the ultimate goal of the
counterfactual is not to impose the Chairmen over the sample period in a way which is consistent with
the speciﬁc way in which their chairmanships have historically evolved. Rather, it is to substitute
(loosely speaking) an ‘average’ of the chairmanships over the entire sample.
29We wish to thank an anonimous referee for stressing the importance of this issue, and for
providing extremely useful suggestions.
30Based exactly on the same kind of logic, Benati (2007b) argues for a dominant role of good luck
in fostering the more stable macroeconomic environment of (roughly) the last two decades in the
United Kingdom: if, by imposing the supposedly bad monetary rule of the 1970s over the entire
sample period, basically nothing changes compared with actual historical outcomes, it necessarily
has to be the case that policy did not play much of a role ...
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tual and counterfactual outcomes over the period following the end of the Volcker
disinﬂation. Second, as for the years up to the end of the Volcker disinﬂation, it
generates counterfactual paths for inﬂation, output growth, and M2 growth system-
atically below actual historical ones. (It has to be stressed, however, that in the case
of inﬂation the diﬀerence is not enormous, reaching a maximum of about minus three
percentage points in the second half of the 1970s, when actual inﬂation was moving
towards ten per cent). Although this is exactly what we would have expected based
on Paul Volcker’s aggressively counter-inﬂationary reputation, what is at ﬁrst sight
puzzling is that such disinﬂationary impact does not get achieved via higher interest
rates at any point in the sample, and especially during the very ﬁrst few years. As the
top-left panel clearly shows, indeed, up until 1976-1977 the counterfactual Federal
Funds rate is broadly in line with the actual one, while during the years between
1976-1977 and the end of the Volcker disinﬂation the counterfactual rate is actually
lower than the historical one (by a maximum of about three percentage points in
1980Q1), thus suggesting that the lower counterfactual path for inﬂation translated,
via the Fisher eﬀect, into a lower path for interest rates. Given that higher inter-
est rates during the very ﬁrst years of the sample are not a possible explanation for
the systematically lower counterfactual paths for inﬂation, output growth, and M2
g r o w t h ,t h em o s tl o g i c a le x p l a n a t i o ni s ,i no u rv i e w ,t h ee x p e c t a t i o n a li m p a c to ft h e
Volcker monetary rule.
Finally, turning to Figure 9, ‘bringing Alan Greenspan back in time’31 would have
had little impact on inﬂation before the collapse of Bretton Woods; it would have had
no discernible eﬀect after 1983-1984; and, most notably, it would have had a prolonged
discernible impact–equal, however, to at most slightly more than three percentage
points–between 1977 and 1981-1982, when inﬂation ﬂuctuated between 5 and 11.6
per cent. As the ﬁrst column shows, such a minor stabilising impact on inﬂation would
have been achieved via higher interest rates, up to two additional percentage points,
in 1975-1977, and subsequently lower output and M2 growth during the second half
of the 1970s.
How vulnerable are these results to the Lucas critique? In spite of the
changes in the systematic component of monetary policy documented in the previous
sub-section, overall, results from counterfactual simulations therefore suggest that
systematic monetary policy was not a tt h er o o to ft h eG r e a tI n ﬂation episode, so
that either non-systematic policy mistakes, or just plain bad luck (e.g., large non-
31It was pointed out by an anonymous referee that, given the comparatively greater uncertainty
associated with the time-varying long-run coeﬃcients in the structural monetary policy rule (see
Figure 6: this is especially clear for the coeﬃcient on inﬂation), ‘bringing Greenspan back in time
means not only higher coeﬃcients on inﬂation and money growth, but also much more volatile
coeﬃcients on inﬂation and money growth.’
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how vulnerable are these results to the Lucas critique? Within a conceptually similar
context, Sims and Zha (2006) raise indeed doubts on the reliability of the results
reported in their Figure 8, depicting counterfactual paths for the Federal Funds rate,
output growth, and inﬂation conditional on an “inﬂation hawk Greenspan” with
doubled coeﬃcients on inﬂation in his monetary policy rule. In particular, they
question the reliability of the signiﬁcant output losses generated by this simulation,
with the counterfactual path for output growth systematically and signiﬁcantly below
the actual one until the beginning of the 1980s:
‘The counterfactual simulations that imply lower inﬂation create a
marked change in the stochastic process followed by output and inﬂation.
It is therefore quite possible that the output costs of the stronger anti-
inﬂationary policy stance would not have been so persistent as shown in
the graphs.’
In plain English, the output losses are so large that (i)t h e yc a n n o tb el i t e r a l l y
believed, and(ii) they most likely results from Lucas critique-type problems. If, within
the counterfactual, the full impact on expectations of the alternative monetary rule
could have correctly been captured, the output losses would most likely be much
lower.
Although solid within the context of the speciﬁc exercise Sims and Zha are per-
forming, such an argument appears (at least to to us) less so within the present
context, for the simple reason that, in two cases out of three, the diﬀerences between
actual and counterfactual paths are nowhere as nearly as dramatic as those depicted
in Sims and Zha’s Figure 8 . Only in the case of the ‘Greenspan counterfactual’ of
Figure 9 the output losses up to the end of the 1970s reach magnitudes comparable to
those generated by Sims and Zha’s “inﬂation hawk Greenspan”. Accordingly, in line
with Sims and Zha, these results should therefore be quite signiﬁcantly discounted.
Figure 9, however, is not our only piece of evidence. In particular, as we previously
stressed–and in line with Benati (2007b)–the fact that imposing the supposedly
‘bad’ monetary rule of the 1970s over the entire sample period (i) implies almost no
diﬀerence between the actual and counterfactual inﬂation paths, and (ii)i ti m p l i e sa
comparatively minor diﬀerence between the actual and counterfactual output growth
paths, represents, in our view, decisive evidence that the systematic component of
monetary policy did not play a signiﬁcant role in generating the high macroeconomic
turbulence of the 1970s.
32Our overall conclusion is therefore in line with Sims and Zha’s (2006) that ‘[...] the estimated
policy changes do make a noticeable diﬀerence, but not a drastic diﬀerence.’
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Figure 10 shows, for each of the four series, and for each single quarter, the frac-
tions of overall variance explained by each individual shock–speciﬁcally, the ﬁgure
shows the medians of the distributions of the fractions together with the 16th and
84th percentiles. The decomposition has been computed in the frequency domain, by
computing, for each quarter, each iteration of the Gibbs sampler, and each series x,
with x = rt, πt, yt, mt, both the series’ actual spectral density–fx,t|T(ω) in (27) and
28–and the four ‘counterfactual’ spectral densities obtained by setting to zero the
variances of each of the fours structural shocks but one.33 Given that a series’ vari-
ance is equal to the integral of its spectral density, this trivially allows for a structural
decomposition of a series’ overall variance at each point in time.34
As the second row shows, demand non-policy shocks explained the lion’s share of
t h ev a r i a n c eo fi n ﬂation during the period up to the beginning of the Volcker disinﬂa-
tion, with (based on median estimates) the fraction of overall variance increasing from
40-50 per cent at the end of the 1960s to a peak in excess of 60 per cent around 1980.
After falling below 40 per cent in 1981, the fraction of inﬂation’s variance due to de-
mand shocks continued to decline during subsequent years, and has been ﬂuctuating
between 10 and 20 per cent over the most recent period.35 By contrast, the fraction
due to policy shocks ﬂuctuated around 10 per cent over the entire sample period–
with the exception of a short-lived spike up to about 20 per cent corresponding to
the Volcker disinﬂation–thus testifying, once again, to the negligible role played by
monetary policy in engineering the Great Inﬂation, even in its non-systematic compo-
nent. The inﬂuence of money demand shocks appears to have been likewise negligible
up to the end of the Volcker Chairmanship, but it has rapidly increased under Alan
Greenspan, reaching almost 30 per cent at the end of the sample. Finally, the frac-
tion due to supply shocks ﬂuctuated around 20 per cent until the beginning of the
Volcker disinﬂation, ‘it rapidly increased under Paul Volcker, and it had been ﬂuctu-
ating, under Alan Greenspan, around 40 per cent. Taken together with the previous
section’s ﬁndings, these results indicate that (i)t h eG r e a tI n ﬂation was due, to an
overwhelming extent, to bad luck, i.e. to large non-policy shocks–in particular, to a
33An important point to stress is that while it can be easily shown that it is not possible to
uniquely identify the innovation variances of the four structural shocks, it is on the other hand
possible to compute the (time-varying) covariance matrix of the VAR that would result from setting
one (or more) of the structural innovation variances to zero.
34To put it diﬀerently, the sum of the four ‘counterfactual’ spectral densities is by construction
equal to the series’ actual spectral density, fx,t|T(ω).
35As it was pointed out by a referee, ‘[i]t is possible that the weight of demand shocks in variance
decomposition of inﬂation and output has fallen exactly because monetary policy changed to less
accommodating, and, in equilibrium, also private sector responses to such shocks diminished. If this
is true, ‘Bringing Greenspan back in time’ would have a huge beneﬁcial eﬀect.’. Here the problem is
that the counterfactuals we performed in the previous sub-section do not support this hypothesis.
To be fair, such counterfactuals are most likely subject to a Lucas critique argument, but then the
issue becomes abandoning the SVAR methodology and using a DSGE model ...
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confronted with those large non-policy shocks, a more aggressive monetary rule like
Chairman Greenspan’s could have stabilised inﬂation only to a minor extent, and at
the price of signiﬁcantly lower output growth in the second half of the 1970s.
Turning to the Federal Funds rate, the ﬁrst column of Figure 10 shows that–quite
reassuringly ...–monetary policy shocks explain a comparatively minor fraction of the
rate’s overall variance, with the bulk of the variation due instead to demand shocks,
especially up until mid-1990s. The fraction due to supply shocks, on the other hand,
remained relatively stable around 15-20 per cent over the entire sample period, with
the exception of the most recent recession, when it temporarily shot up in excess of 40
per cent. Interestingly, the fraction of variance due to monetary policy shocks exhibits
a temporary spike in excess of 30 per cent corresponding to the Volcker disinﬂation
episode.
An analogous spike in excess of 30 per cent for monetary policy shocks corre-
sponding to the Volcker disinﬂation can be seen for output growth. Interestingly,
after ﬂuctuating quite erratically during the period up to 1987, the fraction of output
growth variance due to the non-systematic component of monetary policy stabilised,
under Greenspan, around 10 per cent. Greenspan’s Chairmanship appears to have
been characterised by two other major phenomena: ﬁrst, an analogous decrease in
the fraction of variance due to demand shocks; second, an higher fraction due to sup-
ply shocks. Taken together, all these results are compatible with a view of monetary
policymaking under Greenspan according to which the FED succeeded, to a greater
extent than before, in keeping the economy close to the stochastic trend, minimising
the inﬂuence of demand shocks–either policy or non-policy–in driving output away
from potential, thus allowing supply shocks to dominate output ﬂuctuations.36
5.4 Changes in the transmission of monetary policy shocks
Although, historically, the non-systematic component of monetary policy appears
to have explained only a minor fraction of the overall variance for all series except
M2 growth, it might be of interest to explore how the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy shocks has changed over time. Figure 11 plots, for the four series,
the time-varying median generalised impulse-response functions (henceforth, IRFs)
to a 25 basis points monetary policy shock, while Figure 12 shows the same objects,
together with the16th and 84th percentiles of the distributions, for four selected dates.
Generalised IRFs have been computed via the Monte Carlo integration procedure
described in Appendix B, which allows to eﬀectively tackle the uncertainty originating
from future time-variation in the VAR’s structure. Due to the computational intensity
of such a procedure, IRFs have been computed only every four quarters, starting from
36Another way of putting this is that the Greenspan FED, by keeping the economy closer to the
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eral Funds rate over the sample period, with a 25 basis points shock being followed,
over the ﬁrst part of the sample, by negligible subsequent increases, and being in-
stead followed, over the most recent years, by comparatively larger subsequent hikes,
building up, overall, up to about 40 basis points. It is also worth stressing how,
during the second half of the 1970s, the contractionary impact of a interest rate hike
used to be partially oﬀset by a subsequent ‘reversal’, with the IRF becoming negative
after about 6-8 quarters. Overall, these results are therefore fully consistent with the
ﬁndings of Section 5.2 of an improvement in the conduct of monetary policy post-
October 1979. Turning to the other three variables, once taking into account of the
uncertainty surrounding median estimates (see Figure 12), it is not entirely clear that
IRFs have experienced signiﬁcant changes over the sample period. The exception is
obviously represented by the very last portion of the sample, when the negative im-
pact of a monetary policy shock increases dramatically for all the three variables, but
one likely explanation for such results is simply that the very last quarters have just
been imprecisely estimated.
6A Caveat: The ‘Indeterminacy Hypothesis’
Taken at face value, our results clearly point towards good luck as the most plausible
explanation for the greater macroeconomic stability of the most recent period. But
are there any caveats to our interpretation of these results? We believe that there is an
important one, which is currently being investigated in our related work in progress,37
and is extensively discussed in a companion paper on the Great Moderation in the
United Kingdom,38 to which the reader is referred to for further details.
Our point of departure is the striking contrast between the results from (time-
varying parameters or Markov-switching) structural VARs, and those coming from an
alternative, ‘narrative’ approach. As we previously discussed, the SVAR-based results
of Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), and Canova and
his co-authors suggest–in line with the present work–that plain good luck is the
key reason for the transition from the Great Inﬂation to the Great Moderation in
the United States. The narrative evidence, by contrast–see, in particular the work
of DeLong (1997) and Romer and Romer (2002)–typically points towards improved
monetary policy, with the evolution of the U.S. monetary authority’s understanding
of the functioning of the economy being identiﬁe db yt h eR o m e r sa st h em a i nd r i v e r .
The contrast between the results coming from the two approaches is even more
striking in the case of the United Kingdom. Although Benati (2007c), based on the
same methodology we used in the present work, identiﬁes once again good luck as the
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over the last two decades, as he discusses,39 h i sr e s u l t ss t a n di nm a r k e dc o n t r a s tw i t h
the narrative evidence produced by Ed Nelson and his co-authors,40 which decisively
points towards improved policy. For the purpose of understanding the causes of the
Great Moderation, the U.K. experience is especially interesting because, compared
with the United States, it is so extreme: over the last several decades, the United
K i n g d o mh a sm o v e df r o mas i t u a t i o ni nw h i c hm o n e t a r yp o l i c yw a sr e g a r d e da s
essentially useless for the purpose of controlling inﬂation, to one in which, on the
contrary, it is regarded as the crucial instrument. Further, such a sea change in the
overall intellectual attitude towards inﬂation and monetary policy has been enshrined
in the U.K. ‘monetary constitution’, with inﬂation targeting being introduced in
October 1992, and with the Bank of England being granted independence, and the
Monetary Policy Committee being created, in May 1997. The SVAR-based evidence
of Benati (2007c) is therefore all the more striking ...
How can we reconcile the narrative and VAR evidence? What is going on here?
For the United States, the work of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004), based on DSGE models, has suggested that the transition
from the Great Inﬂation to the Great Moderation was caused by a move from passive
to active monetary policy–more precisely, from an indeterminate to a determinate
equilibrium. In a nutshell, the argument is that, before Paul Volcker’s October 1979
‘Saturday Night Special’, U.S. monetary policy was not suﬃciently strongly counter-
inﬂationary, thus allowing for equilibrium indeterminacy, i.e. for a multiplicity (tech-
nically, an inﬁnity) of possible solutions. After October 1979, on the other hand, a
more decisively counter-inﬂationary policy stance eﬀectively ruled out the possibil-
ity of multiple solutions, thus guaranteeing equilibrium determinacy (i.e., solution
uniqueness). Given that–as shown by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004)–under indeterminacy macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are char-
acterised by greater persistence and volatility, the ‘indeterminacy hypothesis’ provides
a simple and theoretically elegant explanation of the transition from the Great In-
ﬂation to the Great Moderation in line with the narrative evidence of, e.g. DeLong
(1997) and Romer and Romer (2002).
In order to reconcile the evidence coming from the two approaches, Benati and
Surico (2007) therefore consider the following, simple experiment: “Suppose that
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) are right, so that
the truth was, for the United States, ‘bad policy’ (i.e., indeterminacy) before Octo-
ber 1979, and ‘good policy’ (i.e., determinacy) thereafter. Would structural VARs be
capable of uncovering the truth?” Speciﬁcally, they take the simple New Keynesian
workhorse model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), simulate it conditional on the
monetary rules they estimated for the two regimes, and apply structural VAR meth-
ods to the simulated data. In order to make the results as sharp as possible, (i)t h e
39See Benati (2007b, Section 5).
40See in particular Nelson and Nikolov (2004) and Batini and Nelson (2005).
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kept constant across the two regimes; (ii) the volatility of the sunspot shock under
indeterminacy is set equal to zero; and (iii) all the remaining structural parameters
(the Phillips curve slope and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) are kept
constant. By construction, in this experiment everything is therefore uniquely driven
by a move from passive to active monetary policy. Benati and Surico’s (2007) re-
sults suggest that evidence similar to that produced within the structural VAR-based
literature–including the present work–can indeed be generated within a framework
in which everything is driven by a move from bad to good policy. In particular, (1) a
shift from indeterminacy to determinacy can reproduce the main qualitative features
of the Great Moderation. In particular, the shift is associated with decreases in both
the total prediction variance of the system, and in the variances of each individual
series. And (2), the counterfactual experiment of switching the estimated interest
rate rules in the structural VARs across regimes points towards the incorrect con-
clusion that changes in the systematic component of monetary policy did not play a
signiﬁcant role in causing changes of the DGP.
To sum up, although the evidence produced by the structural VAR literature
clearly points towards good luck as the explanation of the transition from the Great
Inﬂation to the Great Moderation, the jury might still be out ...
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have ﬁtted a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with
stochastic volatility to the Federal Funds rate, GDP deﬂator inﬂation, real GDP
growth, and the rate of growth of M2. We have identiﬁed 4 shocks–monetary policy,
demand non-policy, supply, and money demand–by imposing sign restrictions on the
estimated reduced-form VAR on a period-by-period basis. Our main results may be
summarised as follows.
The evolution of the coeﬃcients of the monetary rule in the structural VAR ac-
cords well with narrative accounts of post-WWII U.S. economic history, with (e.g.)
signiﬁcant increases in the long-run coeﬃcients on inﬂation and money growth around
the time of the Volcker disinﬂation. Overall, however, our evidence points towards a
dominant role played by good luck in fostering the more stable macroeconomic envi-
ronment of the last two decades. First, the Great Inﬂation was due, to a dominant
extent, to large demand non-policy shocks, and to a lower extent to supply shocks.
Second, bringing either Paul Volcker or Alan Greenspan back in time would only
have had a limited impact on the Great Inﬂation episode. Although the systematic
component of monetary policy clearly appears to have improved over the sample pe-
riod, this does not appear to have been the dominant inﬂuence in post-WWII U.S.
macroeconomic dynamics.
We have however brieﬂy discussed one potentially important caveat to interpret-
ing the kind of evidence produced in the present work as decisive proof that plain
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good luck has been the key driver in the transition from the Great Inﬂation to the
Great Moderation, based on Clarida, Gali, and Gertler’s and Lubik and Schorfheide’s
‘indeterminacy hypothesis’.References
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Quarterly seasonally adjusted series for the the GDP deﬂator (‘GDPDEF: Gross
Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator, Index 2000=100, Quarterly, Seasonally
Adjusted’) and for real GDP (‘GDPC96: Gross Domestic Product, Billions of Chained
2000 Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate’) are both from the U.S.
Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Monthly seasonally unad-
justed series for the Federal funds rate (‘FEDFUNDS, Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monthly,Percent’) and M2 (‘M2
Money Stock, M2SL, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Seasonally
Adjusted, Monthly, Billions of Dollars’) are both from FRED, the St. Louis FED
database on the web. They have been converted to the quarterly frequency by taking
averages within the quarter and, respectively, by keeping the last observation from
each quarter. The overall sample period is 1959:1-2005:4.
B Computing Generalised Impulse-Response Func-
tions
This appendix describes the Monte Carlo integration procedure we use in section 5.5
to compute generalised IRFs to a monetary policy shock. In order to reduce the
computational burden, we only perform the exercise every four quarters starting in
1968Q1. For every quarter t out of four, we perform the following procedure 1,000
times.
Randomly draw the current state of the economy at time t from the Gibbs sam-
pler’s output. Given the current state of the economy, repeat the following procedure
100 times. Draw four independent N(0, 1) variates–the four structural shocks–and









t are the monetary policy, demand non-policy, supply, and money demand
structural shocks, respectively, compute the reduced-form shocks  t at time t.S i m -
ulate both the VAR’s time-varying parameters, the θt, and the covariance matrix of
its reduced-form innovations, Ωt, 20 quarters into the future. Based on the simulated
Ωt, randomly draw reduced-form shocks from t+1 to t+20. Based on the simulated
θt, and on the sequence of reduced-form shocks from t to t+20, compute simulated
paths for the three endogenous variables. Call these simulated paths as ˆ X
j
t,t+20, j =
1, .., 100. Repeat the same procedure 100 times based on exactly the same simulated
paths for the VAR’s time-varying parameters, the θt; the same reduced-form shocks
at times t+1 to t+20; and the same structural shocks eD
t , eS
t ,a n deMD
t at time t,b u t
setting eR
t to one. Call these simulated paths as ˜ X
j
t,t+20. For each of the 100 iterations
deﬁne irf
j
t,t+20 ≡ ˆ X
j
t,t+20 − ˜ X
j
t,t+20. Finally, compute each of the 1,000 generalised
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April 2007Table 1 Measuring changes in predicta-
bility: time-varying multivariate R2’s in
selected quarters (median and 16th and
84th percentiles)
Federal funds rate Inﬂation
1972:2 0.903 [0.853; 0.941] 0.666 [0.503; 0.808]
1982:2 0.942 [0.903; 0.967] 0.483 [0.282; 0.698]
1992:2 0.962 [0.938; 0.978] 0.179 [0.078; 0.324]
2002:2 0.978 [0.958; 0.989] 0.194 [0.078; 0.366]
Output growth M2 growth
1972:2 0.203 [0.088; 0.368] 0.383 [0.261; 0.532]
1982:2 0.203 [0.090; 0.368] 0.339 [0.205; 0.487]
1992:2 0.114 [0.046; 0.232] 0.358 [0.240; 0.510]
2002:2 0.187 [0.082; 0.359] 0.334 [0.195; 0.507]
T a b l e2 T h ew i d t ho ft h e‘ f a nc h a r t s ’ :
standard deviations (in basis points) of
k-step-ahead projections
Federal funds rate Inﬂation
k=1 k=4 k=8 k=1 k=4 k=8
1972:2 24 57 82 41 63 91
1982:2 34 90 130 39 56 82
1992:2 72 53 921 24 29
2002:2 72 34 622 29 33
Output growth M2 growth
k=1 k=4 k=8 k=1 k=4 k=8
1972:2 98 144 198 107 151 193
1982:2 112 149 203 148 192 238
1992:2 63 76 96 82 110 134
2002:2 59 78 87 93 117 165
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Elements of S Elements of Q
Figure 1: Checking for the convergence of the Markov chain: ineﬃciency factors for
the draws from the ergodic distribution for the hyperparameters and the states
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Figure 2: The evolution of Ωt:l n |Ωt|, standard errors of reduced-form innovations
(in basis points), correlations, and 16th and 84th percentiles
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Figure 3: Time-varying spectra, normalised spectra, and overall variance of inﬂation
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Figure 4: Measuring predictability: median R2, and 16th and 84th percentiles
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Figure 5: The width and shape of the ‘fan charts’: standard deviations (in basis
points) of k-step ahead projections
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Figure 6: The evolution of the systematic component of monetary policy: time-varying
long-run coeﬃcients on inﬂation, output growth, and M2 growth in the structural
monetary policy rule (medians and 16th and 84th percentiles)
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Figure 7: Imposing Arthur Burns-William Miller over the entire sample period: coun-
terfactual minus actual, median of the distributions and 16th and 84th percentiles
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Figure 8: Imposing Paul Volcker over the entire sample period: counterfactual minus
actual, median of the distributions and 16th and 84th percentiles
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Figure 9: Imposing Alan Greenspan over the entire sample period: counterfactual
minus actual, median of the distributions and 16th and 84th percentiles
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Figure 10: Structural variance decomposition: fractions of overall variance explained
by the individual shocks, medians of the distributions and 16th and 84th percentiles
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Figure 12: Median impulse-response functions to a monetary policy shock in selected
quarters (in basis points)
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